

Stateness Index StIx

Codebook

V-Dem Dataset:

Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Lisa Gastaldi, Haakon Gjerløw, Adam Glynn, Ana Good God, Sandra Grahn, Allen Hicken, Katrin Kinzelbach, Joshua Krusell, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Natalia Natsika, Anja Neundorf, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Oskar Rydén, Johannes von Römer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundström, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson and Daniel Ziblatt. 2023.

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Indicators:

- **Monopoly of Law**
 - Domestic autonomy (v2svdomaut)
 - International autonomy (v2svinlaut)
 - Judicial accountability (v2juacct)
 - Legislature closed down or aborted (v2xlg_leginter)
 - Regime interregnum (v2regint)
 - Judicial corruption decision (v2jucorrdc)
 - Executive respects constitution (v2exrescon)
 - Legislature corrupt activities (v2lgcrprt)
 - HOS control over (v2exctlhs)
 - HOG control over (v2exctlhg)

- **Monopoly of Violence**
 - State authority over territory (C) (v2svstterr)
 - Criteria for appointment decisions in the armed forces (C) (v2stcritapparm)
 - Remuneration in the Armed Forces (C) (v2strenarm)
 - Political violence (C) (v2caviol)
 - State of emergency (C) (v2casoe)

- **Monopoly of Administration**
 - Bureaucratic remuneration (C) (v2strenadm)
 - Criteria for appointment decisions in the state administration (C) (v2stcritrecadm)
 - Access to public services distributed by urban-rural location (v2peapsgeo)
 - Public sector corrupt exchanges (v2excrtps)
 - Public sector theft (v2exthftps)

Country Name (country_name)

Afghanistan	El Salvador	Lithuania	Seychelles
Albania	Equatorial Guinea	Luxembourg	Sierra Leone
Algeria	Eritrea	Madagascar	Singapore
Angola	Estonia	Malawi	Slovakia
Argentina	Eswatini	Malaysia	Slovenia
Armenia	Ethiopia	Maldives	Solomon Islands
Australia	Fiji	Mali	Somalia
Austria	Finland	Malta	South Africa
Azerbaijan	France	Mauritania	South Korea
Bahrain	Gabon	Mauritius	South Sudan
Bangladesh	Georgia	Mexico	South Yemen
Barbados	German Democratic Republic	Moldova	Spain
Belarus	Germany	Mongolia	Sri Lanka
Belgium	Ghana	Montenegro	Sudan
Benin	Greece	Morocco	Suriname
Bhutan	Guatemala	Mozambique	Sweden
Bolivia	Guinea	Namibia	Switzerland
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Guinea-Bissau	Nepal	Syria
Botswana	Guyana	Netherlands	Taiwan
Brazil	Haiti	New Zealand	Tajikistan
Bulgaria	Honduras	Nicaragua	Tanzania
Burkina Faso	Hungary	Niger	Thailand
Burma/Myanmar	Iceland	Nigeria	The Gambia
Burundi	India	North Korea	Timor-Leste
Cambodia	Indonesia	North Macedonia	Togo
Cameroon	Iran	Norway	Trinidad and Tobago
Canada	Iraq	Oman	Tunisia
Cape Verde	Ireland	Pakistan	Turkey
Central African Republic	Israel	Panama	Turkmenistan
Chad	Italy	Papua New Guinea	Uganda
Chile	Ivory Coast	Paraguay	Ukraine
China	Jamaica	Peru	United Arab Emirates
Colombia	Japan	Philippines	United Kingdom
Comoros	Jordan	Poland	United States of America
Costa Rica	Kazakhstan	Portugal	Uruguay
Croatia	Kenya	Qatar	Uzbekistan
Cuba	Kosovo	Republic of the Congo	Vanuatu
Cyprus	Kuwait	Republic of Vietnam	Venezuela
Czechia	Kyrgyzstan	Romania	Vietnam
Democratic Republic of the Congo	Laos	Russia	Yemen
Denmark	Latvia	Rwanda	Zambia
Djibouti	Lebanon	Sao Tome and Principe	Zanzibar
Dominican Republic	Lesotho	Saudi Arabia	Zimbabwe
Ecuador	Liberia	Senegal	
Egypt	Libya	Serbia	

Regions (region)

Central America
South America
Northern Europe
Western Europe
Western Africa
Southern Africa
Eastern Asia
South-Eastern Asia
Eastern Europe
Southern Europe

Northern Africa
Western Asia
North America
Southern Asia
Caribbean
Eastern Africa
Oceania (including Australia and the Pacific)
Middle Africa
Central Asia

Year (year)

Year coded annually from 1950-2022.

Typology:

To classify differing types of stateness in accordance to varying degrees of stateness we use a weakest link approach: the classification is determined by the lowest value among dimensional values (i.e., monopolies of law, violence, and administration). This approach prevents compensation and accommodates for the logical structure of necessary components of each dimension of a state.

Typology	Thresholds and Rules of Classification
High functioning State	1 – 0.7, all dimensional scores above 0.7
Moderate functioning State	<0.7 – 0.5, one or more dimensional scores below 0.7 and all above 0.5
Defective State	<0.5 – 0.3, one or more dimensional scores below 0.5 and all above 0.3
Profound defective State	<0.3 – 0.1, one or more dimensional scores below 0.3 and all above 0.1
Collapsed State	< 0.1, one or more dimensional scores below 0.1

Indicators:**1. Monopoly of Law**

Explanatory notes: The Monopoly of Law is based on the premise that legal order, creation and application of law are de facto existent, without competing claims of legal orders or concurrent jurisdiction.

1.1 Domestic autonomy (v2svdomaut)

Question: Is the state autonomous from the control of other states with respect to the conduct of domestic policy?

Responses:

0: Non-autonomous. National level authority is exercised by an external power, either by occupation (e.g. quadripartite occupation of Germany in 1945). It also includes situations in which domestic actors provide de jure cover for de facto control by a foreign power (e.g. Vichy France). However, control of some part of the territory of a state by an enemy during war is not considered control by external actors if the sovereign government remains on scene and continues to wage conventional war (e.g., the USSR during WW II).

1: Semi-autonomous. An external political actor directly constrains the ability of domestic actors to rule, decides who can or cannot rule through formal rules or informal understandings, or precludes certain policies through explicit treaty provisions or well-understood rules of the game from which the subject state cannot withdraw. Examples include Soviet "satellite" states in Eastern Europe, and situations where colonial powers grant limited powers of national selfgovernment to their possessions (e.g., protectorates and limited home government).

2: Autonomous. Domestic political actors exercise political authority free of the direct control of external political actors.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

From: V-Dem-Codebook (Coppedge et al. 2023)

Transformation: Log, min-max (0-1)

1.2 International autonomy (v2svinlaut)

Question: Is the state autonomous from the control of other states with respect to the conduct of its foreign policy?

Responses:

0: Non-autonomous. Foreign policy is controlled by an external power, either de facto or de jure. The most common examples of this are colonial rule and military occupation (e.g. quadripartite occupation of Germany in 1945). Situations in which domestic actors provide de jure cover for de facto control by a foreign power should not be construed as semi-autonomy (e.g. Vichy France). Governments in exile that control underground forces waging unconventional warfare are not considered as mitigating an occupation regime (e.g. countries under German occupation during WWII).

1: Semi-autonomous. An external political actor directly constrains the ability of domestic actors to pursue an independent foreign policy course in some important areas. This may be the product of explicit treaty provisions or well-understood rules of the game from which the

subject state cannot withdraw. Examples would include Soviet strictures over rule in so-called "satellite" states in Eastern Europe, and explicitly negotiated postwar settlements (e.g. Austria following WWII).

2: Autonomous. Domestic political actors exercise foreign policy free of the direct control of external political actors. Direct control is meant to exclude the exercise of constraint or the impact of interdependence in the international system. Treaties in which states concede some part of that control to a supra- or international organization voluntarily, and from which there is a possibility of exit should not be interpreted as a violation of autonomy.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

From: V-Dem-Codebook (Coppedge et al. 2023)

Transformation: Log, min-max (0-1)

1.3 Judicial accountability (v2juacct)

Question: When judges are found responsible for serious misconduct, how often are they removed from their posts or otherwise disciplined?

Responses:

0: Never.

1: Seldom.

2: About half of the time.

3: Usually.

4: Always.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

From: V-Dem-Codebook (Coppedge et al. 2023)

Transformation: Log, min-max (0-1)

1.4 Legislature closed down or aborted (v2xlg_leginter)

Question: Has the legislature been closed down or aborted?

Responses:

0: No.

1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous.

From: V-Dem-Codebook (Coppedge et al. 2023)

Transformation: None (0/1)

1.5 Regime interregnum (v2regint)

Question: Does there exist an identifiable political regime?

Responses:

0: No.

1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous
 From: V-Dem-Codebook (Coppedge et al. 2023)
 Transformation: None (0/1)

1.6 Judicial corruption decision (v2jucorrde)

Question: How often do individuals or businesses make undocumented extra payments or bribes in order to speed up or delay the process or to obtain a favorable judicial decision?

Responses:

- 0: Always.
- 1: Usually.
- 2: About half of the time.
- 3: Not usually.
- 4: Never.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
 From: V-Dem-Codebook (Coppedge et al. 2023)
 Transformation: Log, min-max (0-1)

1.7 Executive respects constitution (v2exrescon)

Question: Do members of the executive (the head of state, the head of government, and cabinet ministers) respect the constitution?

Responses:

- 0: Members of the executive violate the constitution whenever they want to, without legal consequences.
- 1: Members of the executive violate most provisions of the constitution without legal consequences, but still must respect certain provisions.
- 2: Somewhere in between (1) and (3). Members of the executive would face legal consequences for violating most provisions of the constitution, but can disregard some provisions without any legal consequences.
- 3: Members of the executive rarely violate the constitution, and when it happens they face legal charges.
- 4: Members of the executive never violate the constitution.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
 From: V-Dem-Codebook (Coppedge et al. 2023)
 Transformation: Log, min-max (0.7-1)

1.8 Legislature corrupt activities (v2lgcrrpt)

Question: Do members of the legislature abuse their position for financial gain?

Responses:

- 0: Commonly. Most legislators probably engage in these activities.
- 1: Often. Many legislators probably engage in these activities.
- 2: Sometimes. Some legislators probably engage in these activities.
- 3: Very occasionally. There may be a few legislators who engage in these activities but the vast majority do not.
- 4: Never, or hardly ever.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

From: V-Dem-Codebook (Coppedge et al. 2023)

Transformation: Log, min-max (0.7-1)

1.9 HOS control over (v2exctlhs_6)

Question: In practice, from which of the following bodies must the head of state customarily seek approval prior to making important decisions on domestic policy?

Responses:

- 0: None. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs_0]
- 1: A foreign power. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs_1]
- 2: The ruling party or party leadership body (in a one-party system). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs_2]
- 3: A royal council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs_3]
- 4: The military. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs_4]
- 5: A religious body. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs_5]
- 6: A tribal or ethnic council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs_6]
- 7: Other. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs_7]

Scale: Series of dichotomous scales.

From: V-Dem-Codebook (Coppedge et al. 2023)

Transformation: Log, min-max (0.7-1)

1.10 HOG control over (v2exctlhg_6)

Question: In practice, from which of the following bodies does the head of government customarily seek approval prior to making important decisions on domestic policy?

Responses:

- 0: None. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg_0]
- 1: A foreign power. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg_1]
- 2: The ruling party or party leadership body (in a one-party system). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg_2]
- 3: A royal council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg_3]
- 4: The military. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg_4]
- 5: The head of state. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg_5]
- 6: A religious body. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg_6]
- 7: A tribal or ethnic council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg_7]
- 8: Other. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg_8]

Scale: Series of dichotomous scales.
 From: V-Dem-Codebook (Coppedge et al. 2023)
 Transformation: Log, min-max (0.7-1)

2. Monopoly of Violence

Explanatory notes: The Monopoly of violence reflects the state's ability to uphold territorial sovereignty and the state's resources/means to do so.

2.1 State authority over territory (v2svstterr)

Question: Over what percentage (%) of the territory does the state have effective control?

Responses:
 Percent.

Scale: Interval.
 From: V-Dem-Codebook (Coppedge et al. 2023)
 Transformation: z-score, log, min-max (0-1)

2.2 Criteria for appointment decisions in the armed forces (v2stcritapparm)

Question: To what extent are appointment decisions in the armed forces based on personal or political connections or alternatively based on skills and merit?

Responses:
 0: All appointment decisions in the armed forces are based on personal or political connections. None are based on skills and merit.
 1: Most appointment decisions in the armed forces are based on personal or political connections. Only a few are based on skills and merit.
 2: Approximately half of the appointment decisions in the armed forces are based on personal or political connections. Approximately half are based on skills and merit.
 3: Only few of the appointment decisions in the armed forces are based on personal or political connections. Most are based on skills and merit.
 4: None of the appointment decisions in the armed forces are based on personal or political connections. All are based on skills and merit.

From: V-Dem-Codebook (Coppedge et al. 2023)
 Transformation: Log, min-max (0-1)

2.3 Remuneration in the Armed Forces (v2strenarm)

Question: To what extent are members of the armed forces salaried employees?

Responses:
 0: None or almost none are salaried employees
 1: A small share is salaried employees

- 2: About half are salaried employees
- 3: A substantial number are salaried employees
- 4: All or almost all are salaried employees

Ordering: Ordinal.

From: V-Dem-Codebook (Coppedge et al. 2023)

Transformation: Log, min-max (0-1)

2.4 Political violence (v2caviol)

Question: How often have non-state actors used political violence against persons this year?

Responses:

- 0: Not at all. Non-state actors did not use political violence.
- 1: Rare. Non-state actors rarely used political violence.
- 2: Occasionally. Non-state actors occasionally used political violence.
- 3: Frequently. Non-state actors frequently used political violence.
- 4: Often. Non-state actors often used political violence.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

From: V-Dem-Codebook (Coppedge et al. 2023)

Transformation: Log, min-max (0.7-1)

2.5 State of emergency (v2casoe_4)

Question: Was a national state of emergency in place at any point this year?

Responses:

- 0: The legal framework does not allow for a declaration of a national state of emergency. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2casoe_0]
- 1: There was no state of emergency in place at any point this year, even though provisions for a declaration of a national state of emergency exist. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2casoe_1]
- 2: A national state of emergency was in place due to a natural disaster. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2casoe_2]
- 3: A national state of emergency was in place due to a terrorist attack. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2casoe_3]
- 4: A national state of emergency was in place due to an armed conflict/war, domestically or internationally. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2casoe_4]
- 5: A national state of emergency was in place due to mass protest/popular uprising. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2casoe_5]
- 6: A national state of emergency was in place for reasons other than those listed above. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2casoe_6]

Scale: Series of dichotomous scales.

From: V-Dem-Codebook (Coppedge et al. 2023)

Transformation: Log, min-max (0.7-1)

3. Monopoly of Administration

Explanatory notes: The monopoly of administration represents the state's capability to implement policies and govern inhabitants throughout the state territory.

3.1 Bureaucratic remuneration (v2strenadm)

Question: To what extent are state administrators salaried employees?

Responses:

- 0: None or almost none are salaried state employees.
- 1: A small share is salaried state employees.
- 2: About half are salaried state employees.
- 3: A substantial number are salaried state employees.
- 4: All or almost all are salaried state employees.

Scale: Ordinal.

From: V-Dem-Codebook (Coppedge et al. 2023)

Transformation: Log, min-max (0-1)

3.2 Criteria for appointment decisions in the state administration (v2stcritrecadm)

Question: To what extent are appointment decisions in the state administration based on personal and political connections, as opposed to skills and merit?

Responses:

- 0: All appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal or political connections. None are based on skills and merit.
- 1: Most appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal or political connections. Only a few are based on skills and merit.
- 2: Approximately half of the appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal or political connections. Approximately half are based on skills and merit.
- 3: Only few of the appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal or political connections. Most appointment decisions are based on skills and merit.
- 4: None of the appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal or political connections. All are based on skills and merit.

Scale: Ordinal.

From: V-Dem-Codebook (Coppedge et al. 2023)

Transformation: Log, min-max (0-1)

3.3 Access to public services distributed by urban-rural location (v2peapsgeo)

Question: Is access to basic public services, such as order and security, primary education, clean water, and healthcare, distributed equally across urban and rural areas?

Responses:

- 0: Extreme. Because they live in rural areas, 75 percent (%) or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.
- 1: Unequal. Because they live in rural areas, 25 percent (%) or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

- 2: Somewhat Equal. Because they live in rural areas, 10 to 25 percent (%) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.
- 3: Relatively Equal. Because they live in rural areas, only 5 to 10 percent (%) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.
- 4: Equal. Because they live in rural areas, less than 5 percent (%) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.
- 5: Rural-Bias: Because they live in urban areas, 25% or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

From: V-Dem-Codebook (Coppedge et al. 2023)

Transformation: Log, min-max (0-1)

3.4 Public sector corrupt exchanges (v2excrptps)

Question: How routinely do public sector employees grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements?

Responses:

- 0: Extremely common. Most public sector employees are systematically involved in petty but corrupt exchanges almost all the time.
- 1: Common. Such petty but corrupt exchanges occur regularly involving a majority of public employees.
- 2: Sometimes. About half or less than half of public sector employees engage in such exchanges for petty gains at times.
- 3: Scattered. A small minority of public sector employees engage in petty corruption from time to time.
- 4: No. Never, or hardly ever.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

From: V-Dem-Codebook (Coppedge et al. 2023)

Transformation: Log, min-max (0.7-1)

3.5 Public sector theft (v2exthtfts)

Question: How often do public sector employees steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?

Responses:

- 0: Constantly. Public sector employees act as though all public resources were their personal or family property.
- 1: Often. Public sector employees are responsible stewards of selected public resources but treat the rest like personal property.
- 2: About half the time. Public sector employees are about as likely to be responsible stewards of selected public resources as they are to treat them like personal property.
- 3: Occasionally. Public sector employees are responsible stewards of most public resources but treat selected others like personal property.
- 4: Never, or hardly ever. Public sector employees are almost always responsible stewards of public resources and keep them separate from personal or family property.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
 From: V-Dem-Codebook (Coppedge et al. 2023)
 Transformation: Log, min-max (0.7-1)

4. Transformation of Indicators

To correct skewed data, we use a modification of the log transformation (log-Modulus Transformation, John and Draper 1980). The modulus transformation implements a generalisation of the Box-Cox transformation and is applicable to data with both positive and negative values.

As a final step, we normalize our data: to achieve comparability over time, we choose time invariant normalization based on absolute terms (Min-Max transformation), independent from the time of reference (Mazziotta and Pareto 2017: 969). We transform the standardized values to an identical range from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating better performance.

The scale of the indicators that measure informality are transformed to a range from 0.7 to 1, with lower values representing high informality and high values representing limited informality (we inverted some indicators to adhere to a worst-to-best scale).

Dimension	Indicator	Transformation
Monopoly of Law	Domestic autonomy	Log, min-max (0-1)
Monopoly of Law	International autonomy	Log, min-max (0-1)
Monopoly of Law	Regime interregnum	None (0/1)
Monopoly of Law	Judicial accountability	Log, min-max (0-1)
Monopoly of Law	Legislature closed down or aborted	Dichotomous (0.7/1)
Monopoly of Law	Societal Legal Pluralism	Mean, min-max (0.7-1)
Monopoly of Law	Judicial Corruption	Log, min-max (0.7-1)
Monopoly of Law	Legislature corrupt activities	Log, min-max (0.7-1)
Monopoly of Law	Executive respects constitution	Log, min-max (0.7-1)
Monopoly of Violence	State authority over territory	z-score, log, min-max (0-1)
Monopoly of Violence	Criteria for appointment decisions in the armed forces	Log, min-max (0-1)
Monopoly of Violence	Remuneration in the Armed Forces	Log, min-max (0-1)
Monopoly of Violence	National state of emergency due to an armed conflict/war	Log, min-max (0.7-1)
Monopoly of Violence	Political Violence	Log, min-max (0.7-1)
Monopoly of Administration	Criteria for appointment decisions in the state administration	Log, min-max (0-1)
Monopoly of Administration	Bureaucratic remuneration	Log, min-max (0-1)
Monopoly of Administration	Access to public services distributed by urban-rural location	Log, min-max (0-1)
Monopoly of Administration	Public sector corrupt exchanges	Log, min-max (0.7-1)
Monopoly of Administration	Public sector theft	Log, min-max (0.7-1)