




Year 2022 | Context Measurement



The World of States in 2022

The Stateness Index StIx is a tool for measuring stateness and state quality through aggregated and disaggregated data. One exceptional strength of our index rests on both country and year coverage that surpasses existing Indices that measure stateness. Drawing on data from the Varieties-of-Democracy-Project (V-*Dem), the index offers data for more than 170 countries* between 1950 and 2022.

The innovation of the Stateness Index is the distinction between two layers of conceptualization and operation-

Concept: Defining the State

We define the state as an institutionalized social and political order and organization of hierarchical authority that is in exclusive control of the monopoly of law, monopoly of violence and monopoly of administration throughout a given territory and its inhabitants. The three dimensions capture the central functions of the state: legislative, judiciary and executive. These are represented by central institutions. While the first two functions are linked to parliament (rulemaking) and courts (rule control and interpretation), the executive is divided into the function of enforcement (military, alization: the first layer of the concept presents the formal state and stateness that is measured through a set of indicators that represent formal or "official" institutions. The second layer of informality enriches the formal concept with informal institutions that exist alongside the formal institutional framework of a state. The inclusion of the second layer of measurement enhances the concept and captures the "reality" of stateness more accurately than the sole measurement of formal institutions.

police) and implementation (government and state bureaucracy).

Stateness as the performance of institutions denotes that a state can insert and uphold the laws enacted by the regime across its territory, possesses the means necessary to control both territory and populations and commands a bureaucratic infrastructure to implement and exert territorial sovereignty throughout the state territory. Stateness radiates "authoritatively outwards from a centre but stop[s] at defined territorial boundaries" (Mann 1984: 198). It rests on the state's ability to exercise its legal and administrative monopoly as well as its monopoly on the use of force within state borders (Eriksen 2005: 296). More information on the conceptual structure of state measurement is provided by





Stawski, Theresa Paola and Hans-Joachim Lauth 2023: Handbook - Introducing the Stateness Index StIx (https://www.stateness-index.org/en/publikationen)

The Typology of StIx

StIx uses a theoretically grounded typology of states: The *first* threshold at 0.7 separates the "full" presence of components and attributes in line with the root concept of a functioning state from empirical patterns that, although not completely corresponding to the concept of stateness, still fulfil criteria with some minor deficits, i.e., moderate functioning states.

The second threshold is located between moderate functioning and defective states at 0.5. The third threshold at 0.3 is located within diminished subtypes to further differentiate between defective and profound defective states that differ regarding the severity of defects. The fourth threshold specifies at which point attributes and components are no longer sufficiently given, i.e., when the minimal standards are no longer existent (collapsed state; 0.1).



State fragility as a continuous phenomenon encompasses states with small defects (defective states), severe defects (profound defective states) and situations of institutional collapse (collapsed states), where (formal) stateness is de facto absent.


The global distribution of stateness 2022

State collapse

Four states are collapsed in 2022: Yemen, South Sudan, Libya, and Papua New Guinea.

While Yemen, South Sudan and Libya show balanced profiles of state collapse, Papua New Guinea's stateness is highly unbalanced with the defects among the monopoly of administration exceeding the defects among the monopoly of violence and law by far. The Monopoly of Law and Monopoly of Violence fall within the thresholds of a somewhat moderate functioning state although non-state actors frequently challenge the monopoly of violence of the state.


Informality and the politization of the state administration hamper the state's abilities to implement its policies. More importantly, Papua New Guinea suffers from a profound urban bias ("paper state"), i.e., the absence of the state within the periphery: public services and infrastructure are highly deficient to absent outside of major towns and capitals.



Profound defective States

In 2022, 35 States are classified as profound defective states. The majority of this type of stateness is found in eastern Africa, middle Africa, western Africa and Southern Asia.

Within this group of profound defective states countries like the Dominican Republic, Malawi or Egypt show grave deficits among the Monopoly of Administration, while the Monopolies of Law and Violence are moderately functioning.



Other countries like Afghanistan or Syria have no meaningful capacities among all three monopolies, placing these states in the imminent danger of a (returning) state collapse.

Defective States

53 states are classified as defective states in 2022, making this category the predominant type of global stateness. Defective states are found around the globe,





except for western and northern Europe, as well as northern America.

The majority of defective states are stable within this category, contradicting the assumption that defective stateness is inherently unstable. On the contrary, countries like Algeria, Gabon, Iran or Morocco confirm the stability of fragile states. An institutional equilibrium between the monopolies of law, violence and administration in combination with autocratic regimes and informal networks within the state generate the necessary stability.



Moderate functioning states

Moderate functioning states deviate from the idealtype of stateness, but do not pass the thresholds of defective states. Rather, they show (minor) deficits that do not conglomerate to a state of fragility. In 2022, 35 countries are categorized as moderate functioning states like Turkey, Qatar, Bulgaria, or Russia. 16 of those countries (e.g., Oman, Qatar or Kuwait) are classified as high functioning states without the incorporation of the context measurement, leading to the conclusion, that at least within this group of 16, informality bends some rules and procedures of the formal state.

High functioning states

46 states correspond to the legal-rational ideal-type of a state, leading to the classification as high functioning states. Unsurprisingly, this type of stateness is mainly found in Europe, possibly affirming a western bias of measurement. But: countries like Singapore, Costa Rica, Botswana, the United Arab Emirates, Chile or Bhutan also fall into the category of high functioning states, contradicting both a democratic and western bias.

Singapore



Regional Distribution of Stateness 2022

Comparing Stateness across World Regions 2022						
Region	CS	PD	DS	MF	HF	
Caribbean	-	2	-	1	3	
Central America	-	1	4	1	1	
Central Asia	-	1	3	1	-	
Eastern Africa	1	7	6	3	1	
Eastern Asia	-	-	2	1	3	
Eastern Europe	-	1	2	4	3	
Middle Africa	-	6	3	-	-	
North America	-	-	-	-	2	
Northern Africa	1	1	3	-	-	
Northern Europe	-	-	-	-	10	
Oceania (including Aus-	1	1	1	1	2	
tralia and the Pacific)						
South America	-	1	6	3	2	
South-Eastern Asia	-	1	5	3	1	
Southern Africa	-	-	3	1	1	
Southern Asia	-	4	2	2	1	
Southern Europe	-	-	1	5	7	
Western Africa	-	6	8	2	-	
Western Asia	1	3	4	7	2	
Western Europe	-	-	-	-	7	
Total	4	35	53	35	46	

CS = Collapsed State, PD = Profound defective State, DS = Defective State, MF = Moderate functioning State, HF = High functioning State

State Transformation: Changes between 2021 and 2022

State transformation includes any movement along the state-spectrum, i.e., between functioning and collapsed states. Fragilization is a process of declining stateness, covering all transformations towards the pole of a collapsed state, even though this process is not determined





to end in a collapsed state. While the starting point can be a functioning state, it is more likely that states with already pre-existing signs of fragility become more fragile.

Improvements of stateness, meaning any shift closer to the pole of a functioning state with the above defined features, are labelled strengthening of stateness (Stawski and Lemm forthcoming).

Declines in StIx Total Value (context)						
Top 5 Coun-	2021		2022	Change		
tries	Total	Rank	Total	Rank	Change	
Tanzania	0,73	51	0,63	82	-0,10	
Senegal	0,62	93	0,54	115	-0,08	
Guinea-Bis- sau	0,44	144	0,37	153	-0,08	
Bolivia	0,60	99	0,53	117	-0,07	
Azerbaijan	0,51	128	0,44	142	-0,07	
Gains in StIx Total Value (context)						
Top 5 Coun-	2021		2022	Change		
tries	Total	Rank	Total	Rank	Change	
Yemen	0,02	174	0,11	172	0,09	
Zambia	0,55	114	0,63	84	0,08	
Tajikistan	0,38	155	0,44	143	0,06	
Slovenia	0,77	45	0,83	33	0,06	
Syria	0,22	169	0,28	165	0,06	


Stateness is deteriorating in many countries: the number of states that experienced a decline of stateness between 2021 and 2022 (102) outweighs those states that experienced a positive development of stateness (68). These declines occur in every region of the world and affect predominantly already defective states.

Gains: State strengthening

The five countries that show the most pronounced signs of state strengthening are Yemen, Zambia, Tajikistan, Slovenia and Syria.

Between 2021 and 2022 Slovenia improved from a moderate functioning (2020-2021) to a high functioning state. Strenghtenings among the monopolies of law and administration lead to the re-classification as a high functioning state.


Syria, a collapsed state between 2017 and 2019, showed small improvements of the state. Yet, Syria is still a profound defective state in an ongoing civil war, that threatens the existence of the state.



Yemen is still a collapsed state, although minor improvements among all three monopolies are detectable. Zambia showed strong improvements among the monopoly of law, but the monopoly of administration remains defective. Tajikistan, a profound defective state, saw improvements among both monopoly of law and monopoly of violence, while the monopoly of administration continues to be profoundly defective.

Declines: Loss of Quality and State Fragilization


Although the Tanzanian state lost control over a part of its territory with a subsequent descent of the monopoly of violence, Tanzania remains a moderate functioning state.



Senegal's stateness has deteriorated from a moderate functioning to a defective state. Both the monopoly of violence and the monopoly of administration sank beneath the thresholds of 0.5. The conflict in Casamance and violent non-state actors challenge the state's monopoly of violence. The state's apparatus is not capable to permeate the whole state territory, basic administration and infrastructure is focused in urban areas.







Although monopoly of law and monopoly of violence deteriorated in Guinea-Bissau, the state remains profound defective. Bolivia changed categories between 2021 and 2022 and was downgraded to a defective state. The state's monopoly of violence is not evenly present in all parts of the territory. In some remote areas, nonstate actors are de facto the highest authority. Azerbaijan was downgraded to a profound defective state, after a decline of both monopoly of law and monopoly of administration. Although Azerbaijan regained control over most of its internationally recognized territory in 2022, it became more dependent on Russia and Turkey.

Top 10 and Worst 10 Performer in 2022

With a total Index value of 0.93 Singapore leads the ranking of 2022, placing an electoral autocracy at the top of all states. The monopoly of violence is undisputed, the highly trained and skilled personnel in both administration and armed forces implement and execute the laws enacted by the regime. The state is fully capable to fulfil its jurisdictional functions to enforces the laws within its territory. The infrastructure encompasses the whole territory, and due to the ruling Party's (People's Action Party) rigorous fight against corruption most corruption cases end with conviction.

Overall, the study shows a broad distribution of findings, spanning the entire measurement spectrum. At the same time, different state profiles become visible. It remains to be said that the functioning state, which is mainly to be found in the OECD spectrum, is the exception and not the rule.

Top 10 Performer 2022 (context measurement)						
	Total	ML	MV	MA	Rank	
Singapore	0,93	0,88	0,96	0,95	1	
Australia	0,92	0,93	0,93	0,90	2	
Denmark	0,91	0,91	0,92	0,91	3	
Netherlands	0,90	0,90	0,92	0,89	4	
Estonia	0,90	0,93	0,95	0,85	5	
Luxembourg	0,90	0,87	0,97	0,88	6	
Norway	0,90	0,90	0,88	0,92	7	
Belgium	0,90	0,89	0,93	0,89	8	
New Zealand	0,90	0,91	0,92	0,87	9	
Germany	0,90	0,94	0,89	0,87	10	
Worst 10 Performer 2022 (context measurement)						
	Total	ML	MV	MA	Rank	
Libya	0,03	0,00	0,07	0,37	173	
Yemen	0,11	0,15	0,12	0,09	172	
South Sudan	0,15	0,50	0,06	0,11	171	
Afghanistan	0,22	0,18	0,37	0,16	170	
Chad	0,23	0,29	0,41	0,10	169	
Central African Republic	0,24	0,40	0,27	0,13	168	
Haiti	0,25	0,37	0,35	0,12	167	
Somalia	0,28	0,55	0,26	0,15	166	
Syria	0,28	0,22	0,36	0,28	165	
Venezuela	0,29	0,34	0,41	0,18	164	
Papua New Guinea	0,30	0,68	0,55	0,07	163	

ML = Monopoly of Law, MV = Monopoly of Violence, MA = Monopoly of Administration