For a more realistic measurement that targets the de facto existence of the monopoly of law, the second level indicators aim at uncovering situations of societal legal pluralism and parasitic state-centred informal institutions. While the state-centric approach views the state as supreme and monolithic lawmaker, legal pluralism highlights the multitude of partially autonomous and self-regulating social fields that also produce law.

The indicators (1) “Head of State control over” and (2) “Head of Government control over” measure the occurrence of non-state public authority that have customarily to be consulted prior to making important decisions on domestic policies, namely a tribal or ethnic council. The third indicator (3) “Executive respects constitution” measures if members of the executive respect the constitution. (4) “Judicial corruption decision” discloses the exploitation of public power for private gain. The fifth indicator (5) “Legislature corrupt activities” captures if members of the legislature abuse their position for financial gain.

Method of Aggregation: Arithmetic mean with equal weights.

The monopoly of violence enables the state to enforce rules, including the control of violence throughout the state´s territory. If a state cannot successfully repress or prohibit non-state violence within its territory it has lost control over its monopoly of violence. This includes situations in which the state is challenged by competing claims to the monopoly of violence or by excessive practice of violence within society.

(1) “Political Violence” measures the level of violence of non-state actors within society. The indicator (2) “State of emergency due to an armed conflict/war, domestically or internationally” identifies domestic or international situations of imminent danger to the monopoly of violence. No valid indicator for the degree of state-centred informality within the armed forces exists.

Method of Aggregation: Arithmetic mean with equal weights.

To assess the de facto functioning of the administration, we measure the extent of neopatrimonial domination, i.e., the co-existence of patrimonial and legal-rational bureaucratic domination (Erdmann and Engel 2006). Neopatrimonial rule thrives within the framework of legal-rational bureaucracy: although formal rules exist, the separation of the private and public sphere is not maintained.

Informal institutions based on personal or political connections undermine formal civil service rules, even if formal rules are in place to determine employment and recruitment of the state bureaucracy.

(1) “Public sector corrupt exchanges” measures the average of routinely given favours of public sector employees in exchange for bribes or other material inducements. (2) “Public sector theft” aims at uncovering if public sector employees steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal use.

Method of Aggregation: Arithmetic mean with equal weights.